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The purpose of this essay is to show how cultural politics has effected the 
relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The 
primary focus in this essay will be the period starting from 1949, the same year as 
the beginning of communist party’s control in China. Through an outline of cultural 
rhetoric and government policies during the Cold War, this essay will serve to find 
points of tension between the two world superpowers and outline the effects of Cold 
War foreign policies on relations in the 21st century. In this essay, the intricate 
relationship between culture and politics will also serve as the basis for the study 
with respects to Cold War-era politics and debunking of common dilemmas related 
to modern and past US-China foreign policy. Through the discovery of a cultural 
“middle ground”, modern US-China foreign relations have the potential to grow and 
prosper into a mutually beneficial relationship which not only aids in bilateral 




















A History of Confliction 
The strain in the relations of US-China foreign policy rests in a history of 
general distrust. Both nations have historically held each other at arm’s length due 
to certain historical events which have shaped foreign policy. In the United States, 
anti-Chinese sentiments were legitimized with the passing of the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882 and further justified after the rise of the Communist Party in 1949. The 
United States, while engaged in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, also watched 
the newly-founded People’s Republic of China carefully to ensure security and the 
containment of communism on the East Asian front. In China, a string of events in 
the 19th century and national humiliation at the hands of Western powers with 
intentions of colonization shaped how the Chinese viewed the Western world. The 
devastating after-effects of the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1900) sealed China’s world 
view and set the foundations for the closed-door policy which dominated dealings 
between the US and China until the formal normalization of relations in the 1970s. 
Despite the cooling of the relationship between the two nations, there is still an 
underlying sense of animosity between them which still plays a role in the 
controlling of relations and is influenced by historical dealings. 
Modern day Chinese foreign policy analysts are much more hopeful of 
positive US-China relations than their Cold War-era counterparts. Since the pivotal 
meetings throughout the 1970s which first formalized relations between the two 
countries, beginning with President Richard Nixon’s meetings with Chairman Mao 
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Zedong in 1972, there has been a much more positive shift toward an optimistic 
view of China. As stated by Robert Sutter (2009, 1), 
The recent record of Chinese foreign policy demonstrates much greater 
moderation, engagement, and integration with the existing world order than 
prevailed in the past. Some analysts in China and abroad foresee a clear road 
ahead for China. They see Chinese leaders following a strategy that deals 
pragmatically with world conditions, conforms to international norms, and 
pursues international peace, development, and harmony seen in the interests 
of China, its neighbors, and other concerned powers, notably the United 
States. 
 
The change came around the end of the 1960s, during the time of an ideological shift 
between the Soviet Union and China; China distanced itself from its communist 
counterpart and moved towards the United States.1 While the US was focused on 
containing the influence of the USSR, it found methods for keeping China in check as 
well. US-China foreign policy was tense for approximately twenty years, during 
which time the United States sought to destabilize the communist government 
(much like it was doing in the Soviet Union), contain Chinese communism through 
involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and create a “divide and conquer” 
strategy to ultimately end communism worldwide.2 When the Soviet Union and 
China began to split, the United States made China an ally for the sake of 
counteracting against the Soviet Union.3  What was once seen as an unthinkable 
partnership soon became one of cooperation on unexpected fronts. However, 
despite the fact that China began to economically open itself to Western capitalism, 
                                                        
1 Huang, Xiaoming. "Managing Fluctuations in U.S.-China Relations: World Politics, National  
Priorities, and Policy Leadership." Asian Survey 40, no. 2 (2000): 269-95. 
2 Cheng, Dean. "The Complicated History of U.S. Relations with China." The Heritage Foundation. 
October 11, 2012. Accessed January 18, 2018. https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-
complicated-history-us-relations-china. 
3 "U.S.-China Relations Since 1949." Asia for Educators. 2009. Accessed January 18, 2018. 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm. 
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the communist regime has remained long past the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s, leaving some speculation as to the future of the government in China 
and the potential consequences of this continuing ideological divide between China 
and the West. 
 
History of Cold War-Era Politics 
Mao-Era Relations 
 The founding of modern-day China came at a crucial time in international 
political history. At the very beginning of the Cold War, the “domino effect” of 
communism reached China, where the US aimed to have a partner in the East Asia 
region to combat the very same ideology ruling the rival USSR. On October 1, 1949, 
Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared the founding 
of the People’s Republic of China, sealing the CCP’s victory over the Kuomintang 
(KMT, or Nationalist) Party; the KMT established an exile government on the island 
of Taiwan.4 Before the CCP was established as the ruling government, Mao 
announced a vow of alliance with the USSR, further alienating the US. As a result of 
the pre-existing campaign against communism in the West, the US, under then-
President Harry Truman, chose non-recognition of the new mainland government, 
instead maintaining relations with Taiwan.5 The decision to diplomatically 
recognize Taiwan was primarily meant to be a move to protect the island from 
                                                        
4 Cheng, Dean. "The Complicated History of U.S. Relations with China." The Heritage Foundation. 
October 11, 2012. Accessed January 18, 2018. https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-
complicated-history-us-relations-china. 
5 Xia, Yafeng. "The Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy." E-International Relations. June 16, 2008. 
Accessed March 01, 2018. http://www.e-ir.info/2008/07/16/the-cold-war-and-china/. 
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succumbing to communism under the domino effect.6 China’s proximity across the 
Strait of Taiwan made the island susceptible to direct influence by the mainland; to 
combat this, the US supported Taiwan through development of the economy, 
political system, and military capabilities. 
The first twenty years of the Cold War and the relations of the time were 
marked by multiple domestic and international developments in and around China. 
Domestically, the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) stained China’s reputation with the rest of the world due to both 
policies’ disastrous aftershocks. During the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s attempt to 
ultimately propel China into economic and agricultural success resulted in one of 
the worst man-made disasters in history; what started out as an attempt to show 
the USSR the effectiveness of the CCP’s communist policies ended in famine and 
cases of widespread torture, which took the lives of more 30 million Chinese citizens 
over a three-year period. However, while most estimates place this number between 
20 to 30 million, the highest records go up to 45 million deaths).7 Less than five 
years later, the Cultural Revolution, which started as a nationwide effort to 
dramatically reform the political culture of China, resulted in an additional 2 million 
deaths of CCP dissidents and those who were considered enemies of Mao. China 
became economically stagnant, hunger was widespread (not to the extent of the 
Great Leap Forward, but enough to create social strife), and intellectuals and 
                                                        
6 Chai, Winberg. "The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations: An Interpretation." Asian  
Affairs 29, no. 3 (2002): 131-47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172554.  
7 Dik, Frank. "Mao's Great Leap to Famine." The New York Times. December 16, 2010. Accessed 
March 02, 2018. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/opinion/16iht-eddikotter16.html. 
Baxley 8 
government officials who attempted to reform the party were killed or “re-
educated”.8 Ending with Mao’s death in 1976, China has since made progress 
towards rectifying the faults of both policies. 
Internationally, two wars to combat the spread of communism in Asia 
indirectly pit members of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against the US. 
First, during the Korean War (1950-1953), China and the USSR backed the efforts of 
the North Korean military, while the US and their allies backed the South Korean 
armed forces; in total, the war ended with a death toll of 1.5 million Chinese and 
North Korean soldiers and civilians.9 China was an unexpected combatant in the 
conflict because it was a new state with a struggling economy and the conflict was 
not in its immediate territory.10 However, from that point on, China fell into the US’s 
narrative of the domino effect of communism; China, as an ally of both the USSR and 
North Korea after its founding in 1953, effectively became an ideological enemy of 
the US. Having lost mainland China to communism, the US became a closer ally to 
Taiwan, at that time the independent Republic of China, to protect the island as a 
fledgling democracy in East Asia, at a time when vulnerable states were more likely 
to be influenced by China or develop their own Marxist-style political system. 
                                                        
8 Phillips, Tom. "The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about China's political convulsion." 
The Guardian. May 10, 2016. Accessed March 02, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-
need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion. 
9 Weatherby, Joseph. The Other World: Issues and Politics of the Developing World. 9th ed. Boston, MA: 
Longman, 2011. 
10 Zhou, Bangning. 2015. “Explaining China's Intervention in the Korean War in 1950.” Interstate - 




Less than a decade later, China and the US would become combatants in 
another North-South ideological war. Vietnam’s strategic position south of China 
had the potential to give China and the USSR a footing in Southeast Asia; if the 
nation were to convert to communism, it would become another significant ally in 
the region. The ultimate goal of both China and the USSR was to convert Vietnam to 
communism, providing support to the National Liberation Front (NLF) of the north 
while the US lent support to the south.11 Although China’s involvement with 
Vietnam had a slow start, with the aim to not escalate direct conflict with the US, 
promises of aid in the event of an invasion of North Vietnam were always a 
possibility. One such major promise was made in 1963, one year before China 
became directly involved in the conflict, when then-chief of staff Luo Ruiqing vowed 
that China would come to North Vietnam’s defense if there was an attack by the US 
(Jian 1995, 359). It was believed that, without China’s involvement with North 
Vietnam, the war would not have turned in favor of the communists. However, 
outside of China’s influence on the direction of the conflict, not much is known about 
the extent of Chinese involvement in the war. Many documents regarding the war 
appear in the perspective of the US, there is little documentation by the Chinese 
government, and, according to historian Qiang Zhai, the Vietnamese rarely 
acknowledge Chinese involvement due to their nationalist pride and belief that they 
won on their own.12 
                                                        
11 "Chinese and Soviet Involvement in Vietnam." Alpha History. April 11, 2016. Accessed March 24, 
2018. http://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/chinese-and-soviet-involvement/. 
12 DiLorio, Tim, and Qiang Zhai. "China Contributed Substantially to Vietnam War Victory, Claims 




 China’s move towards normalization with the US began when China’s alliance 
with the USSR ended. According to Yafeng Xia, “Many scholars have contended that 
the primary causes of the Sino-Soviet split stemmed from their conflicting national 
interests, which overwhelmed their shared ideological beliefs.”13 It was the two 
states’ divided views on the future of communism, as well as conflicts of interest and 
shared resources, that caused their ultimate diplomatic divide.14 While the Soviets 
under Nikita Khrushchev sought a kind of co-existence with Western capitalism, the 
Chinese under Mao believed in the spread of communism through aggressive 
means.15 By 1963, the foundations of distrust were already in place. Chinese and 
Soviet political leaders were divided on the future of communism, while the Chinese 
felt ever threatened by the Soviets’ military prowess. While the Vietnam War was 
still ongoing during this period of time, North Vietnam chose to align with the USSR, 
and in response, China ended its involvement in Vietnam by withdrawing personnel 
and aid support. With China and the USSR at odds, Mao began to look towards the 
US as an ally to counter potential Soviet aggression.  
A 1969 conflict between China and the USSR on Zhenbao Island, a small 
island partially claimed by both states, nearly led to war between the two and 
marked the formal end of their alliance. Additionally, China’s lack of sophisticated 
nuclear capabilities, compared to the USSR which had been developing its program 
                                                        
13 Xia, Yafeng. "The Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy." E-International Relations. June 16, 2008. 
Accessed March 01, 2018. http://www.e-ir.info/2008/07/16/the-cold-war-and-china/. 
14 Farley, Robert, Imad K. Harb, Doug Bandow, and Denny Roy. "How the Soviet Union and China 
Almost Started World War III." The National Interest. February 9, 2016. Accessed April 26, 2018. 
15 History.com Staff. "Rupture between USSR and China Grows Worse." History.com. June 14, 2009. 
Accessed April 22, 2018. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/rupture-between-ussr-and-
china-grows-worse. 
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for much longer, would have made China an easy target for Soviet aggression.16 The 
US had accepted the split as a way to divide the communist bloc and give the West 
the upper hand on key issues in the conflict. Ultimately, China became closer to the 
US once it realized that it could not maintain two conflict fronts. Geographical 
nearness to the USSR also encouraged China to open dialogue with the US, given that 
it felt it could not confront the USSR on its own.17 In the meantime, the US had 
gained a strong hold on the conflict by creating an alliance with China, making its 
union stronger and creating another stronghold in East Asia with the largest state in 
the region. Although small steps were taken at first, 1970 marked the informal 
beginning of China’s normalization with the US and the rest of the world.  
 
Post-Mao and Opening of Relations 
1972 proved to be a pivotal year in the developing of US-China relations. It 
was during this year that the Shanghai Communique was issued; when a joint 
international summit was held, then-President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State 
William Rogers, and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with Premier 
Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong to discuss the future of US-China relations. 
During the meeting with Zhou and Mao, the two nations came to an agreement 
which started the path to normalization between them. In breaking the silence, key 
                                                        
16 Farley, Robert, Imad K. Harb, Doug Bandow, and Denny Roy. "How the Soviet Union and China 
Almost Started World War III." The National Interest. February 9, 2016. Accessed April 26, 2018. 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-soviet-union-china-almost-started-world-war-iii-
15152. 




issues concerning both nations were discussed for the first time, some of which are 
still relevant to this day. 
In the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the question of Taiwan’s status was 
presented as one of the meeting’s major stipulations of the opening of US-China 
relations. As stated in the Communique: 
The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial 
question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the 
United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole 
legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long 
been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal 
affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces 
and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese 
Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one 
China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and 
“independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be 
determined.”18 
 
After this meeting, the US also agreed to avoid mediating in China-Taiwan relations. 
In later years, Taiwan would become a divisive issue in US-China relations and stand 
to test the relationship between the two great powers. To this day, the triangle of 
US-China-Taiwan relations is further complicated by the US’s strategic military and 
economic interests on Taiwan and China’s historical possession of the island. 
For Taiwan, the 1970s was a period of dramatic change. For China, it marked 
the beginning of the track to recognition in the international community and 
normalization with the US, a state which it once considered its political antithesis. 
On October 25, 1971, weeks before the meeting of the Shanghai Communique, 
Taiwan, at the time under the name Republic of China, was formally removed from 
                                                        
18 Nixon, Richard. "Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of 
China." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 27 Feb. 1972. Web. 06 June 2017. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203. 
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the United Nations by a vote from the General Assembly and replaced by the 
People’s Republic of China as the international representative of China. As the 
government of China at the time of the organization’s founding in 1945, Taiwan 
continued to be the representative of China in the international community 
(partially due to worldwide anti-communist sentiments against the new ruling 
government in the mainland).19 On January 1, 1979, the US officially changed its 
diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing and severed all formal ties with Taiwan.20 
However, despite the official changes in relations, Taiwan still remains as an irritant 
in US-China relations. The US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 
which came into direct conflict with the Shanghai Communique and the agreement 
of the recognition of only “one China.” The pro-Taiwan camp, including 
policymakers and lobbyists, have always been central to defining how the US 
conducts its foreign policy with China, in relation to how it affects affairs in 
Taiwan.21 This has frequently created upsets with China, who seek to isolate Taiwan 
from the rest of the international community at all costs. While the Cold War 
tensions may be all but over, Taiwan is the one question which still needs to be fully 
answered by both sides involved. 
Mao passed away in 1976, but the progress towards normalization was 
completed under his successor, Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989). Deng was reform-
                                                        
19 "Oct. 25, 1971 | People's Republic of China In, Taiwan Out, at U.N." The New York Times. October 
25, 2011. Accessed February 26, 2018. https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-
1971-peoples-republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un/. 
20 "United States announces that it will recognize communist China." History.com. December 15, 
2009. Accessed February 26, 2018. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-
announces-that-it-will-recognize-communist-china. 
21 Chai, Winberg. "The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations: An Interpretation." Asian  
Affairs 29, no. 3 (2002): 131-47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172554.  
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minded, but his sights for change were set only towards the idea of economic 
opening. Coming off the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which disrupted social 
life and destabilized the political state, Deng’s CCP created enough political reform 
to rebuild China’s political system and reform its image in the international 
relations. Mao’s radical policies by which he ruled the country left a negative 
impression on the international community; Deng, on the other hand, sought better 
relations with the rest of the world to enact his open-door economic policies and put 
China on the road to economic prosperity.22 However, although his party relieved 
enough political pressure to repair the country after the Cultural Revolution, 
political reform was not part of Deng’s agenda. Pro-democracy reforms, a force 
present throughout the 1980s, were suppressed at their onset, as Deng was a strong 
advocate for the preservation of China’s one-party system of rule. The student-led 
protests were opposed by Deng, who viewed them and their political advocate, Zhao 
Ziyang, as the biggest threat to the party’s absolute rule.23 By the end of the decade, 
China would face its most damaging moment in its modern history: the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre. 
The Tiananmen Square Massacre was one of the first transpiring events, 
which led to the end of the Cold War. The student-led protests which occurred over 
the course of two months called for the beginning of democracy in China and the 
end of the leadership that the new generation of emerging Chinese citizens deemed 
                                                        
22 McCollom, Jason. "Deng Xiaoping and Chinese Economic Reform." Study.com. Accessed March 01, 
2018. https://study.com/academy/lesson/deng-xiaoping-and-chinese-economic-reform.html. 
23 Wei, Wu. "Why China's Political Reforms Failed." The Diplomat. June 04, 2015. Accessed March 01, 
2018. https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/why-chinas-political-reforms-failed/. 
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too oppressive to lead them. Deng, who had been resistant to reform in his own 
country, feared that China would be affected by the same movements taking place in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev of the 
Soviet Union in Beijing only gave the movements more motivated to push forward 
and pressure the government to change or step down. The nearly month-long 
peaceful vigils turned violent on June 4th, 1989, when the Chinese military clashed 
with the protesters, firing into the crowd and arresting dissenters. While some tried 
to escape, others fought back with rocks and fire bombs.24 The government 
crackdown, resulting in 10,000 arrests and an estimated thousands of deaths, 
soured the positive relations that the US and China had been attempting to build for 
nearly 20 years. Three weeks later, the George H. W. Bush administration imposed 
economic sanctions on China in response to the violence, and world leaders all over 
the world, even Gorbachev himself, denounced the use of force against the peaceful 
dissenters.25 The display of civilian resistance in China further fueled the 
movements in Eastern Europe which brought down the Berlin Wall, communism, 
and the Soviet Union within two years. For the US and China, the day of violence in 
Beijing and the end of the bipolar Cold War ushered in a new era of tensions, 
partially undoing the progress since 1972. 
 
Immediate Aftershocks of the End of the Cold War 
                                                        
24 Jian, Chen, and Jeffrey A. Engel. "The Rift That Began in Tiananmen Square." Foreign Policy. 
November 09, 2009. Accessed April 21, 2018. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/09/the-rift-that-
began-in-tiananmen-square/. 
25 History.com Staff. "Tiananmen Square Massacre Takes Place." History.com. June 4, 2009. Accessed 
April 21, 2018. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/tiananmen-square-massacre-takes-
place. 
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 The Cold War was notably marked by a bipolar distribution of power divide, 
pitting the capitalist US against the communist USSR and their respective allies. 
During this period, China experienced an alliance shift to begin the process of 
opening foreign relations with the US. The bipolar power struggle maintained 
stability in the international community, in the sense that nearly every other state 
allied themselves on either side and regional hegemonies were well established; in 
turn, China fell into this bipolarity as a state which did not exactly fit for both sides, 
yet served the interests of both the US and USSR at different times during the 
conflict. 
 However, once the USSR fell, much of the world found itself in a power 
vacuum, China came into view as a potential replacement for the communist 
superpower. Although it was still relatively weak by this point in its history, rapid 
growth since the economic reforms of the 1980s put it on its way to becoming the 
East Asia regional hegemon.26 The breakdown of relations following Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 also contributed to the long decade of the 1990s which held the 
potential to make or break relations altogether. Xiaoming Huang (2000, 270) 
asserted that Beijing thought of the US as a supporter of the domestic pro-
democracy movements, thus playing a role in destabilizing the Chinese Communist 
Party. In response to Tiananmen Square, the US condemned the CCP on the 
international level and suspended exchange programs which were contributing to 
the normalization of relations (Ibid, 271). The US was beginning to re-establish itself 
                                                        
26 Gill, Bates, and Nicholas R. Lardy. "China: Searching for a Post-Cold War Formula." Brookings. 
September 1, 2000. Accessed April 26, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-searching-
for-a-post-cold-war-formula/. 
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as a world hegemon while simultaneously searching for another rival similar to the 
USSR. Nearly four decades of a bipolar international community created conditions 
where few could comprehend a world without a power struggle. While the Cold War 
brought tensions and the potential for direct conflicts, it also entailed its own 
security status quo; one former superpower falling into a power vacuum gave rise to 
the other’s dominion of the international community, as well as the potential for 
someone to challenge it. 
 Huang’s prescription for this struggle is simple: the periods of the Cold War 
and its immediate aftermath were marked by two different types of international 
systems. The Cold War was maintained by a structural system, which dictated the 
direction of relations and was not easily influenced by superficial forces. According 
to Huang (2000, 276), “Because of the universal nature of its discourse, the 
structural forces in the cold war [sic] system could be transported effectively across 
boundaries of ideology and culture. Consequently, the differences in those areas 
between the U.S. and China in the 1970s were not sufficient to prevent them from 
developing mutual understanding.” The structural system required a strategic 
maintenance of power and a sense of control in the anarchic international 
community. Although there were cultural and ideological differences between the 
US and China, they were willing to transcend those boundaries for the sake of formal 
relations.  
 In the immediate post-Cold War era, the international community was no 
longer being supported by the stability of the bipolar distribution of power in the 
international system; it was replaced by the less rigid cultural system. The Cold War 
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held the international community together in a unique brand of peaceful tensions, 
where a set of agreed-upon rules decided how the realist “game” was being played. 
According to Thomas L. Friedman, there were many parts of the conflict that the 
Cold War defined as its’ “own”, unlike anything the world had ever seen: 
“The Cold War had its own rules: in foreign affairs, neither superpower 
would encroach on the other’s sphere of influence; in economics, less 
developed countries would focus on nurturing their own national industries, 
developing countries on export-led growth, communist countries on autarky, 
and Western economies on regulated trade. … The Cold War had its own 
perspective on the globe: the world was a space divided into the communist 
camp, the Western camp, and the neutral camp, and everyone’s country was 
in one of them. … And lastly, the Cold War had its own defining anxiety: 
nuclear annihilation.”27 
 
The Cold War system kept the world in balance while the USSR was still a present 
force. In the absence of an ideological enemy for the US to counteract; at the same 
time, the US was placed in a position to re-establish itself as the world hegemon. 
Given the shock of the events following the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the 
immediate end of the Cold War, the relationship between the US and China took a 
crucial hit, as the US began to crackdown on China’s political suppression and China 
responded in turn with accusations of manipulating the pro-democracy movements 
of the 1980s. Politically, China filled in as the ideological rival to the US’s brand of 
democracy. Economically, while the US and China had much promise as trade 
partners, many economists and citizens in the US feel threatened by the idea of 
increased competition in the job market and the dismantling of US economic 
hegemony. 
                                                        
27 Friedman, Thomas L. "Chapter 1: The New System." In The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 3-17. New 
York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999. 
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Modern Day Implications of Cold War-Era Politics 
It can be said that the effects of Cold War-era politics are still being felt in 
many aspects of cultural and political life between the United States and China. 
Feelings of current relations amongst China scholars and analysts have been mixed 
and constantly changing over the last decade. For this section, two sources of 
information, a survey from 2008 and a general analysis of the past year, are used to 
frame this inquiry. A 2008 survey by Zhong and Shen captures the opinions of 132 
China scholars as they assessed the US-China relations at the time. The results were 
surprisingly optimistic, as over 90 percent of the respondents viewed the relations 
as fair or good (Zhong and Shen 2008, 360). Likewise, security was their most 
important concern, given the presence of potential sources of conflict, including 
Taiwan, the growing nuclear weapons program in North Korea, and regular 
diplomatic spats with Japan (Ibid). Even then, they asserted that, if anything, both 
states’ interest in Taiwan would become a source of conflict for the future; after 
controlling for Taiwan’s presence, over 60 percent of the respondents believed that 
a major conflict between the US and China was highly unlikely (Ibid, 361). Analysts 
in 2008 were certain that US-China policy were on the right track to success, with 
the exception of a few security and economic concerns along the way.  
Things have certainly changed by 2018. After the 2016 presidential election 
of Donald Trump, an active critic of Chinese economic practices and a candidate who 
promised to “control” China’s expansion as a world power, analysts predicted a 
negative turn in foreign relations. As expected during the presidential campaign 
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process, there is now a “trade war” underway between the two states. The Trump 
administration is seeking to rectify what it believes to be unfair trading policies 
which benefit China more than the US.28 Politically, the US has been alternating 
between support for China and promises of upholding the one-China status quo, and 
increasing ties with Taiwan, which sometimes violates certain protocols regarding 
Taiwan’s status as a semi-autonomous region of China. The acceptance of a 
diplomatic phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, the first of its kind 
since the switch to recognition of China in 1979, was the first step towards the 
Trump administration’s pendulum-like China policy. Like the prediction from the 
scholars in the 2008 survey, Taiwan has become an even larger separating force in 
US-China relations.29 
On the public end, recent surveys have shown that Americans are concerned 
with several key policy issues related to China. A 2016 survey of 1000 Americans 
and 200 Chinese Americans conducted by the Committee of 100 highlights multiple 
sources of potential resistance between the American public and increasing US-
China foreign relations. Although more people hold generally favorable views of 
China compared to the unfavorable (57% compared to 43%; Committee of 100 
2016, 30), other areas of concern related to policy tell a somewhat different story. 
77% of American respondents and 64% of Chinese American respondents believe 
                                                        
28 Karabell, Zachary. "Perspective | A trade war with China would backfire on Trump - and America." 
The Washington Post. January 16, 2018. Accessed February 20, 2018. 
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that China has the potential to become a military threat to the United States (Ibid, 
34). 55% of Americans hold an overall view of distrust towards China and believe 
that America should approach better relations with caution (Ibid, 37). Generally, 
more respondents were concerned with the idea that America is consistently losing 
jobs to China than any other primary issue, some of these stemming from Donald 
Trump’s constant assertions that China is notorious for “stealing jobs” from 
American workers30. These areas of policy opinions lead some political analysts to 
have a pessimistic view of the future of US-China foreign relations.  
However, another positive sign of growth in the public’s perceptions of China 
is the idea of the employment of culture being shared between the two countries. 
Only 25% of respondents believe that the presence of Chinese culture has had an 
unfavorable impact on America, while 59% of the respondents claim to see 
favorable impacts as a result of culture exchange. (Another 15% believed there was 
no impact at all.) Two-thirds (68%) of both the general public and Chinese-
Americans (65%) believe the US government is becoming more accepting of China’s 
rise to a superpower status and will most likely try to work together in the future to 
create a positive relationship built on collaboration. The other 31% and 36%, 
respectively, believe that the US is actually trying to stop China’s advancement as a 
superpower, which could lead to the stifling of relations (Committee of 100 2016, 
47). Despite the appearance of increasing relations with Taiwan, the majority of 
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both the general public and Chinese-Americans (59% and 56%, respectively) 
believe that the US should not intervene if Taiwan declared independence and 
hostilities led to military conflict across the strait.  
One of the main pressing issues is determining how China will handle 
possible aggression from North Korea. China’s primary foreign policy issue is 
regional safety, and North Korea is currently the biggest threat to security in the 
East Asia region. Since the divide of the two Koreas in the early 1950s, China has 
been the rogue state’s top ally in several areas, ranging in severity from economic 
support to the forced repatriation of captured defectors. As China has become closer 
to the US, there has been the looming issue of China’s relationship with North Korea, 
despite the constant threats to the US and other regional neighbors including South 
Korea and Japan. In the last year, there has been a shift in how China is dealing with 
North Korea; for example, China has been reducing its economic relations by cutting 
off key trade routes for products such as oil and textiles.31 The US and China could 
become much closer partners if China continues to cooperate on enforcement.  
However, the problem keeping China from being too strict on the regime is 
China’s fear of the fallout of a government collapse. If the North Korean government 
were to collapse, it would create an influx of North Korean refugees into China, with 
few taking the risk of crossing the De-Militarized Zone into South Korea.32 While 
China is verbally committed to condemning North Korea for its recent military 
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developments, it is not prepared to handle a refugee crisis. Additionally, the regional 
instability that a government collapse would bring to East Asia would be 
catastrophic and take years to rectify. China’s hesitance to be stricter on North 
Korea sends a message to policymakers in the US that China realistically does not 
want to sever ties with the regime. This misinterpretation of Chinese intentions 
originates from the misunderstanding of China’s foreign policy goals: its hesitance 
results from fears of a future where it takes the responsibility of picking up a fallen 
North Korea’s pieces. 
 
Conclusion: The Future of US-China Foreign Policy 
 In February of 2018, the foreign ministry of China made a bold and strong 
claim: that the US was clinging to a “Cold War mentality” in terms of how the US 
goes about business with China. In a single report, the National Posture Review 
(NPR), the US took two controversial steps: 1) it made a plan to development 
smaller nuclear weapons to increase and diversify its arsenal, and 2) it condemned 
four nations – China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran – as potential nuclear threats.33 
The report was criticized by at least three of the four nations listed as a catalyst to 
the threat of nuclear war. This “Cold War mentality”, as mentioned by China’s 
foreign ministry spokesperson Ren Guoqiang, entails that the US is both seeking to 
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call-out a specific nuclear rival and make little effort to reduce its own nuclear 
stockpile while simultaneously condemning others for their own. 
Ren’s statement makes a striking point in the status of US-China relations: 
the concept of living in a state similar to that of the Cold War did not go away after 
1989. Despite steps taken towards progress in building positive relations, the US 
and China still have a long time before completely moving away from the hostilities 
of the past. Although diplomatic relations still go through periods of decreasing and 
increasing cooperation, cultural appreciation has been steadily increasing among 
portions of the American population, as shown in the survey taken by the 
Committee of 100. There is still work to be done before US citizens can fully trust 
China and their Chinese counterparts, but the foundations of mutual trust are being 
laid today. The only way to move forward with relations is to settle Cold War-era 
tensions and leave them in the past. While continued relations are best sustained by 
leaders who will put aside their differences to make it work, this is not exactly a 
requirement for partnership. What is a necessity, however, is the understanding 
that the two states are starkly different in their governance and national interests, 
yet cooperation is much more beneficial when speaking of long-term foreign policy 
goals. 
The US relationship with China has made a strong point: the presence of a 
rivalry does not negate the importance of interdependent cooperation. Despite the 
turbulence of political relations since the 1970s – Tiananmen Square and the end of 
the Cold War being the most prominent examples of this – the US and China have 
remained economically and diplomatically dependent for two extremely important 
Baxley 25 
reasons: national interests and international security. Both the US and China realize 
the importance of having each other as trade partners for the support of each 
other’s large economies. Additionally, political stability between the two states 
could both reduce the incentives for armed conflict and encourage better diplomatic 
and economic practices. Over the last half-century, the leadership of both nations 
have consistently sought the benefits of better cooperation, which has helped 
improve relations significantly since the early days of the Cold War yet still has to 
overcome remnants of challenges from that period.  
The most crucial factor to consider when discussing the future of US-China 
relations is the prospect of changes under the Donald Trump administration. Before 
taking office, Trump was an avid critic of Chinese practices ranging from economics 
and trade to political and international policymaking. Speculation amongst analysts 
and China scholars believed that relations with China would take a drastic downturn 
under the Trump administration. Three primary issues have been the markers of 
Trump’s policy with China so far: Taiwan’s position and the US’s long-standing 
commitments to the island, reform in the economic relations, and China’s strategic 
role in reigning in North Korea. First, Trump’s policy between support for Taiwan 
and support for the current one-China agreement has taken consistent turns, 
alternating between supporting Taiwan in times of peace and returning to the status 
quo when China protests. One such action, the sale of $1.2 billion worth of American 
military supplies and intel to Taiwan, was taken after Trump promised Chinese 
president Xi Jinping that the US would decrease ties with Taiwan and build better 
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relations with China.34 Second, the status of the US-China economic relationship has 
been damaged by the accusations from Trump and his supporters that China 
unfairly benefits from trade deals. There is now an ongoing “trade war” stemming 
from high tariffs on more than $45 billion worth of Chinese goods and materials, a 
move that analysts anticipate will hit China’s economy and high rates of GDP growth 
by the end of this year.35 Third, as mentioned earlier, Trump views China as an 
instrumental asset in the US’s bid to destabilize North Korea and halt their nuclear 
weapons program. While China has been cooperating with sanctions on North Korea 
from the international community, there has still been hesitance from China because 
North Korea as a failed state would do much more direct harm to China than anyone 
else. Some, including Trump himself, feel that China is not doing enough to help 
punish North Korea and, to some extremes, accuse China of continuing to prop up 
the Kim regime by not taking enough action. 
A year into the Donald Trump administration, the future of relations with 
China are still unpredictable. If, by some chance, Trump were to reverse his harsh 
stances against China and actively work towards a stronger partnership, relations 
would have the potential to flourish. However, under the Trump administration, this 
will be no easy task. Trump is notorious for being “consistently inconsistent”: taking 
one stance one day and a completely different stance the next. This has been evident 
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through the example of the Taiwan issue; Trump makes a promise to Xi one day to 
maintain the current one-China policy, and makes a promise to Taiwanese president 
Tsai the next that the US will maintain its security relationship with China and take 
measures to increase relations. The future of US-China relations rests in the 
encouragement of open dialogues and consistency that comes along with 
communication. The maintenance of current US-China relations is not an effortless 
task; it requires the continuation of the work put into the building of the 
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